Armenian Aspirations, Turkish Intrigues, and French Double Standards
GARABET K. MOUMDJIAN
INTRODUCTION
As a result of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, Cilicia, an Ottoman region in the southeastern corner of Asia Minor , was brought under French control from December 1918 until October 1921. The initial months of occupation were marked by measures taken first by the British and then by the French to bring over 170,000 Armenian refugees back to their homes. The majority of repatriates were Cilician Armenians, whom the Turks had forcibly deported to the Syrian Desert in 1915.
During the war, the Allied powers had repeatedly assured Armenians and other minorities of the empire that they were soon to be freed from the Turkish yoke. The French, at least during the initial stage of their occupation of Cilicia , tried to repopulate the region with Armenians. Encouraged by French support, Armenians hoped to create an autonomous Armenian entity in Cilicia .[1]
The rise of Turkish nationalism under Mustafa Kemal, ethnic rivalries between Armenians and Turks, and a shift in French policy to one of rapprochement and then of agreement with the Turkish nationalist movement shattered Armenian dreams and compelled thousands of Armenians to forsake the area with the retreating French forces.
On October 30, 1918 , aboard the British battleship Agamemnon anchored in the Turkish port of Mudros , the representatives of a defeated Ottoman Empire signed a humiliating document of surrender. The Turkish defeat in the battle of Arara (Palestine, September 1918) against the Allied expeditionary force under the command of General Edmund Allenby was a major factor in forcing the Ottoman Empire out of World War I. According to the stipulations of the armistice, the defeated Ottomans had to accept the Allied occupation of those Ottoman territories that were considered "strategic" for preserving peace. Moreover, article 16 of the Mudros Armistice stated, among other things, that the defeated Turkish army -- stationed at the time in Adana , Cilicia -- was to retreat north of the Bozanti-Hajin-Marash line, where its soldiers were to be demobilized. Accordingly, the British were to occupy the province of Adana Cilicia after the armistice. The British thought they could hold on to Cilicia even though that was contrary to the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement by which Britain and France had practically divided the Levant between themselves.[3] The agreement stated that, in the event of an Allied victory, France was to acquire Syria together with Cilicia and other territories in eastern Anatolia and Mesopotamia .[4]
Towards the end of December 1918, a French civil administration with small French military contingents was installed in Cilicia . However, because of the lack of sufficient forces, the British remained for one more year. The British and thereafter the French encouraged Armenians who had been deported from Cilicia to repatriate. As a result, over 170,000 Armenian refugees returned. However, postwar rivalries between the French and British allies on the one hand, and Kemalist incursions, on the other, gradually destroyed Armenian aspirations towards an autonomous Cilicia . On October 21, 1921 , France signed the Ankara Agreement with the Kemalists and relinquished Cilicia to them.[5] By January 1922 the region was brought under Kemalist control.
This paper focuses on the province of Adana Cilicia will be assessed. Although the scope of this paper is the plain of Cilicia, an area encompassing the cities of Mersin , Tarsus , Adana , Jihun, Osmaniye, Deort-Yol, Toprak-Kale, Ayas, Payas, and Alexandretta, the main focus will be on the provincial capital of Adana
THE FRENCH ADMINISTRATION
In accordance with the stipulations of the Mudros Armistice, British forces occupied Cilicia in November 1918. It remained under direct British control until February 1919, when a French civil administration was installed there (although British forces remained in Cilicia until the end of 1919). During the four months of British control, the existing Ottoman administration was kept intact awaiting new orders from Jerusalem , the Allied headquarters in the Levant , as to how it should be replaced. Because of this uncertainty, many of the cadres of the Turkish army defied the order to retreat, and were placed in the still-intact Ottoman administration.[6] It was these new Turkish officials that, disguised under their new administrative titles, constituted the nuclei of the Kemalist committees, which became a menace to the French administration during the following three-year period.[7] Moreover, Turkish and French sources agree that retreating Turkish troops sold or simply left a good portion of their weapons (totaling some twenty five thousand rifles and depots of ammunition) behind for the Turkish population. These were hidden in underground caches.[8]
The armistice also tolerated the formation of a gendarme unit, all of whose three thousand members were recruited from among the retreating Turkish troops.[9] This police force was put under the command of Colonel Hashim Bye, an ex-Ottoman officer who "was continuing to wage war against the allies."[10]
Because of the numeric weakness of French combatants in the Levant, the Allied headquarters in Jerusalem agreed to keep the nineteenth Indian Brigade of the British army, under the command of General Norman Leslie, in Cilicia .[11] In December 1918, the Legion Arménienne, which was stationed in the city of Beirut after the victory at Arara, was sent to Cilicia under the command of lieutenant colonel Louis Romieu. The fourth battalion of the Armenian legion was stationed in Alexandretta (Iskandarun), and its units were deployed in that port city, Deort-Yol, Osmaniye, and Baghche. The first, second, and third battalions went ashore at the port of Mersin and were deployed in Mersin , Tarsus , Adana
Although the French brought in some Algerian battalions after the British left, the insufficient number of French soldiers in the province continued to be a real problem for the French administration. Moreover, problems created by the shortage of combatants were worsened by the lack of munitions, fuel, food, and means of transportation. [14]
Problems the French faced in Cilicia
The Allied headquarters divided the Levant into four occupational territories. Cilicia comprised the Northern Occupation Territory with the city of Adana Adana February 1, 1919 , and assumed his duties as the head of the civil administration of the province. [16] The cities of Marash, Aintab, Urfa Aleppo
At the time when the French civil and military administrations had started to organize and regulate living conditions in Cilicia, Georges Picot, the French High Commissioner in Syria and Armenia[18] and one of the signatories of the Sykes-Picot agreement --whose position and duties, according to Bremond, were "poorly defined and subsequently caused much friction between him and the local officials in Cilicia and elsewhere"[19] -- encouraged and even urged Armenian deportees stationed in Syria to repatriate to Cilicia.[20] A total of 120,000 deportees, mostly women, children, and elderly people thus returned home. They were transported to Adana
Colonel Bremond's administration was put to its first test in the beginning days of April 1919. On the sixth day of the month, a special administrative order was released from the office of the Chief of Administration stating that “all lands and properties, movable or otherwise, which belonged to Armenians prior to their deportation in 1915 and were later confiscated by local Turkish authorities and distributed among the Turks in Cilicia, had to be returned to their original owners in a period of two months." Moreover, the administrative order stated that even if people had actually bought such properties from the Turkish authorities, they should immediately return them to their original owners if they were claimed as such. The newly revived Agricultural Bank was to compensate those who had bought such properties.[23]
The Turks, to whom the administrative order was apparently directed, regarded the French demand as an infringement on their rights. The French administration did not initiate this order, but rather acted on instructions received from Allied headquarters in Jerusalem Haifa , Palestine
Turkish sources have more than bitter words for the special court system that the French administration had formed to look after and decide in land ownership cases. Rejep Dalkir, a former officer in the Turkish army who, through the help of some influential Turks, had remained behind and had assumed an administrative position in the Sis (Kozan) municipality, blames the French for the initiation of the Tesviye-i Mesalih Komisyoni (Brokerage for Settlement of [Property] Rights) courts. He writes in his memoirs that this court system was established to benefit Armenian "settlers" by confiscating Turkish lands and handing them over to Armenians without proper judicial procedures.[25] It must be noted, however, that the activities of the aforementioned court were limited to only a few hundred cases, not all of which were decided in favor of Armenian plaintiffs. Often, Armenians, because of their sudden and panicky deportation in 1915, had left everything behind and hence could not produce the proper Tapus (Tapu, Turkish for land deeds) to reclaim their properties. Moreover, if unjust acts of land confiscation had actually occurred, it is to be assumed that almost all such cases had to taken place near or around the major cities where French protection was provided, since no Armenian could have ventured to confiscate lands from Turks in the remote villages. In any case, Armenians did not have a free hand in confiscating Turkish properties, since the French administration, in its effort to reestablish law and order, would not allow them to do so. Moreover, Turkish peasants, encouraged by Kemalist agitators, disrupted the implementation of the orders of the arbitrating court. Dalkir and other Turkish sources do not mention the fact that after the deportation of the Armenians in 1915, the Turkish government had relocated some eight thousand Turkish muhajirs (refugees) from the Balkans and Russia into Cilicia and had allowed them to settle on Armenian properties.[26] It caused the French administration much hardship to send some of these families back to where they had come from, while the rest continued to dwell on their newly acquired properties
Suffice it to say that the French administration made special arrangements for all non-Cilician Armenians repatriating to Cilicia . These people, together with Cilicians from the remote villages of the province, were settled in tent towns in the provincial capital of Adana village of Sheikh Murad near Adana Adana
The arbitrating court posed problems and created friction between Turks and Armenians in Deort-Yol, Hasan-Beyli, Harouniye, and other places.[32] The French were unable to calm the situation. It can be argued with certainty that the inability of the French to confront this issue was due mainly to the limited number of their forces in Cilicia . Therefore, Pierre Redan's estimate that "the arbitrating court solved the problem (i.e. the land ownership issues) and contented both parties with their decisions" [33]cannot be readily accepted.
Another issue that damaged French prestige in Cilicia was the court's decision to bring some Unionist (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) perpetrators of the 1915 genocide to justice. This court turned out to be a complete failure. Presided over by an ex-Ittihadist judge and having a Greek as an inquisition officer, the court considered only a fraction of the cases brought before it by the French administration and Armenian organizations. After several months of interrogations and deliberations, not even one Turkish official was convicted.[34]
Kemalist cells and their development
Nazim Bey, who was the Vali (governor) of the province when the British and the French occupied it, saw to it that during the few months that he remained in office (until September 1919) ex-Ittihadist and Kemalist propagandists had a free hand in disseminating their ideology within the Turkish population. It seems that the vali was not content with helping Turkish agitators. He was personally involved in the organization of a secret network of "Union and Progress" party cells in almost all the major cities and towns. One of his associates, Nehad Pasha, was even encouraged by the governor "to form Islamic organizations directed against the Christian population and the French Administration".[36]
Turkish sources confirm that Ittihadist and Kemalist committees were active in Cilicia during the first months of the British occupation. Those committees were being nourished by such organizations as the Kilikia Mudafaa-i Hukuk Jemiyeti (Organization for the Defense of Kilikia's Rights), which was formed in Constantinople by some Cilician Turks, who soon after dispatched some of their members to Cilicia .[37] Apparently, the committees were directed against the Allied occupiers. Turkish agitators tried hard to convince the Turkish population that only an armed struggle could liberate Cilicia from the French.
On 28 April, 1919 , Colonel Bremond, head of the French administration in Cilicia , issued yet another crucial order demanding the population to hand over all weapons to the French authorities within twenty four hours.[38] The order was generated from Constantinople where General Allenby was on a short visit. Allenby’s fiat was conducted masterfully in the areas under British Rule including the Eastern Occupational zone (Marash, Aintab , and Kilis).[39]
Once again it was obvious that the order was directed against the Turks. In February 1919, the French administration had uncovered a secret plan that called upon the Turkish population to participate in riots and take up arms against the French administration. The French order was thus intended to disarm the Turks and lessen the possibility of any new uprising. As in the case of the April 6 order, this one too was not vigorously imposed, even though one Turkish author exaggerates by writing that "Turks were thus deprived even from carrying their hunting rifles," or that "some of those who defied the order were punished by being drowned in the Sihun River."[40]
Another issue that became a source of friction between the Turks and the French authorities in Cilicia was that of the French tricolor replacing the Ottoman flag. As an occupied area of the Ottoman Empire, Cilicia was to fly the flag of the victors, in this case, that of the French. However, the replacement of the flag was totally unacceptable to the Ittihadists and Kemalists whose agitators used the issue to stir up Turkish nationalist emotions against the French. Trouble came on March 18, 1919 , on the occasion of the French High Commissioner's visit to Cilicia . In preparing for Georges Picot's official visit, the French Administration had decorated the main boulevards of Adana Armenian Republic in the Caucasus , was raised alongside the French insignia. According to Turkish sources, the raising of the French and especially the Armenian tricolors was an insult that the Turks could not tolerate. For Turks, the question was one of national honor. Encouraged by Ottoman officials, some Turks desperately tried to fly the Ottoman banner on all official buildings and schools. The French responded by apprehending some of the vandals and imprisoning them for short periods of time.[41]
The involvement of Turkish officials in anti-French activities was one of the delicate issues that faced the French in Cilicia . French authorities had virtually no control over the activities of the vali and the high-ranking Ottoman officials. The only instance in which the French authorities took a firm stand against the still operating Ottoman administration was immediately following the disturbances that took place in the beginning of February 1919. Some of the Turkish agitators arrested during the initial rioting in Adana Constantinople . He was replaced by Jelal Bey, who continued his predecessor's work and even surpassed him. As for Hashim Bey, he, as head of the gendarme force, was under French jurisdiction. As soon as the investigation was over, a warrant was issued for his arrest. He was apprehended and sent to serve his prison term in Syria
General Leslie, a British officer who was at the time acting as the commander of the Allied occupation forces in Cilicia, appointed the French Captain Luppe as the new inspector-in-chief of the three thousand man gendarme force. The latter assumed his duties on April 24, 1919 . His first task was to reduce the force to two thousand two hundred men by ousting all the suspicious elements that were involved in the uprising plan. Captain Luppe enlisted some five hundred Armenians and other Christians into the force.[43]
The mild French response to Turkish agitation coupled with the administration's inability to implement sound policies created suspicions within the Armenians. Obviously, Armenians wanted more than what the French were able to deliver. The major setback in French-Armenian relations occurred towards the end of 1919, when the French High Commissioner in the Levant, Georges Picot, not only halted the process of Armenian repatriation to Cilicia, but he even ventured to travel to Ankara Ankara --which he undertook upon completing his mission in the Levant--was a turning point in French policy toward Armenians in Cilicia . Moreover, Picot's visit and the change in French attitudes regarding Armenians coincided with the presentation of the somewhat inflated Armenian demands to the Peace Conference in Paris
The Delegation of Integral Armenia, headed by Avetis Aharonian, representative of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia , and Boghos Nubar Pasha, representative of the National Armenian Delegation, introduced an Armenian agenda to the Peace Conference, which stated, among other things, that Cilicia was to be made part of the Armenian state to be created by the Allies.[45] The Armenian demand of encompassing Cilicia in the future Armenian state was alarming to the French. It became a major consideration in the change of French policy towards Armenians in Cilicia . Picot, who at the beginning of 1919 had assured Armenians that he was doing everything in his power to encourage massive Armenian repatriation to Cilicia , declared after a few months that the repatriation process was an expensive venture that had cost the French treasury more than ninety million francs, and had to be halted because of insufficient funding.[46]
On leaving the Levant, Picot went to Ankara and met with Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the Turkish nationalist movement, who was fighting to oust the French from Cilicia . Picot's visit was to clear obstacles against Franco-Turkish cooperation as was manifested in the signing of the Ankara Treaty in October 1921. Although some French sources emphasize the fact that in traveling to Ankara Picot was acting in accordance with the recommendation of the French government that was furious at Armenian demands concerning Cilicia, Bremond finds the visit contradictory to Allied and French policies in the Levant . He also states that Allied headquarters in Jerusalem and Constantinople criticized Picot’s meeting with Kemal.[47]
Picot's visit damaged the prestige of the French administration in Cilicia . The Kemalists realized that French interest in the area was decreasing. Accordingly, Kemalist attacks on French occupation forces gained momentum during the period immediately after the visit. The last of the British forces left Cilicia in November 1919. The departure of the much-needed British regiments created new problems. The French High Commissariat in Beirut tried to remedy the situation by dispatching several companies under the command of General Dufieux to Cilicia . Upon arrival, Dufieux was named commander-in-chief of the French occupation forces in Cilicia . He assumed his duties on December 2, 1919 .[48]
The arrival of General Dufieux coincided with that of the newly appointed vali, Jelal Bey, whom Constantinople had sent to replace the deposed governor, Nazim Bey. The new vali was an Ittihadist functionary whom Bremond describes as "intractably Francophobe." [49] Jelal Bye not only neglected the existence of the French administration and encouraged local Turks to rebel against the occupation forces, but he was instrumental in strengthening and furthering the cause of anti-French groups.[50] Moreover, Jelal Bey’s appointment was contrary to the stipulations of the 1918 armistice in that Constantinople had designated him without asking for the consent of Allied headquarters.[51] Turkish historian Kasim Ener writes that, upon his arrival to Adana , Jelal Bey was greeted by a delegation comprised of Turkish eshraf (notables), Ittihadist leaders, and undercover Kemalists with whom he conferred for two days: "As soon as [Jelal Bey] arrived at Adana Adana , Sadik Pasha in Tarsus and his son-in-law, Hakki Bey were against the French occupation of Cilicia . . . It so happened that Jelal Bey joined forces with these people."[52]
Jelal Bey’s appointment coincided with Mustafa Kemal's declaration of the illegality of the French occupation of Aintab and Marash.[53] In January 1920 Kemal ordered his troops to attack Marash. Although the local French garrison and the several French companies stationed there were able to halt the Kemalists, Colonel Norman, the commander of the French troops in Marash, for reasons that remain moot even today, ordered his troops to retreat from the city without first warning the Christian population.[54] Only half of the eight thousand Armenians were able to join the retreating French forces; Kemalist bands wiped out the rest.[55] The retreat from Marash to Osmaniye was a disaster because of the harsh winter of 1920. Hundreds of French soldiers and Armenian refugees froze to death, while the rest reached their destination exhausted.
French sources admit that the retreat of their forces from Marash was a shameful act of cowardice rather than a tactical, military move. Moreover, the retreat from Marash was a severe blow to the already fading French reputation in Cilicia .
From another perspective, the fall of Marash was a much needed victory for the Kemalists; it enabled them to win the support of Turkish peasants and even some Turkish elements that had previously opposed Kemal and his nationalistic policies. Mustafa Kemal was now ready to galvanize this popular support and accelerate his offensive. Two months later, in March, Kemalist forces besieged the Armenian stronghold of Hadjin. Meanwhile, in the Eastern occupation zone, some Kemalist units were fighting the French in Aintab . It was during these trying times that a twenty-day truce was signed on May 28, 1920 .[56] The French agreed to hand over Aintab to the Kemalists, who, contrary to the provisions of the truce, tightened their grip over Hadjin and terrorized Armenians in Sis (Kozan) and the surrounding villages. Thousands of Armenians took refuge in Sis, from where they retreated with the French forces south of the Mersin-Osmaniye railway.
The fall of Marash, Aintab, and Sis, the siege of Hadjin, and the French retreat south of the Mersin-Osmaniye railway alerted Armenians in Adana Adana Adana
From January to June 1920 the vali, Jelal Bey, continued to communicate freely with the Kemalists. He was able to inform them of the positions and movements of the retreating French forces.[58] The French administration even became aware that it was the governor who was spreading the rumor that the French were soon to evacuate Cilicia .[59] After the fall of Aintab, Jelal Bye tried to organize a similar Kemalist incursion and takeover in Adana Constantinople .[61]
Four months later, in October 1921, the French finally gave in by signing the Ankara Cilicia was brought under Kemalist control while the French retreated south of the Alexandretta-Midan Ekbez-Kilis line. Armenians had to once again leave their ancestral homes and follow the retreating French troops.
THE ARMENIAN LEGION
From December 1918 to November 1919 the four battalions of the Armenian Legion constituted the majority of French occupation forces in Cilicia . The five thousand Armenian soldiers of the legion were deployed in the plain of Cilicia with advanced posts at Bozanti and Baghche. During this period, the British units maintained their positions in the Taurus and Amanus tunnel system as well as the Eastern Occupational Zone. Although several Algerian companies strengthened the four Armenian battalions, at no time did french troops in Cilicia reach the number that was necessary and sufficient to control the region.
Allied commanders had on several occasions commended Armenian soldiers for their bravery and perseverance. French commanders had repeatedly assured Armenian legionnaires that they were not being sent to Cilicia as forces of occupation but as liberators to form the nucleus of an Armenian army that was to be created soon. These initial French assurances were soon forgotten. A systematic policy of dishonoring and discharging Armenian soldiers was implemented.
The idea of forming an Armenian fighting unit alongside the French army in the Levant was that of Boghos Nubar Pasha, a prominent Egyptian Armenian who had served in several ministerial posts under the Khedives. In 1916, Nubar Pasha left Egypt for Paris Cilicia from Turkish rule."[64] The agreement also stated that the proposed Armenian battalions were to be trained by the French and considered as part of the French Army.[65] They were to fight alongside the Allied troops and later be deployed in Cilicia where an autonomous Armenian entity was to be created as a result of an eventual Allied victory.[66]
Following the agreement, a French military delegation was dispatched to Egypt Syria Port Said Antioch
The first battalion was recruited from this refugee camp. Soon, Syrian Arabs and other Christian soldiers, who had either deserted the Ottoman army or were captured by Allied troops in Yemen and/or southern Mesopotamia , joined the Legion d'Orient. The French military command relocated the Legion to Cyprus , where new Armenian volunteers from Egypt , Europe, and the United States
That opportunity came in September 1918, when orders were issued to Allied forces in the Levant, under the command of General Edmund Allenby, to attack the Turkish Yildirim army, stationed in Palestine
French sources state that at least three of the Armenian battalions were instrumental in the battle of Arara, which ended in total Allied victory. Twenty-three Armenian soldiers died and scores were wounded as a result of the September 18 offensive.[68] After a short rest, the Armenian battalions marched north with the rest of the Allied troops that liberated Syria and the Lebanon Palestine to Beirut Haifa Beirut
Because of some misunderstanding and friction between the Armenian volunteers and the predominantly Muslim population of Beirut the French relocated the Legion d'Orient to the coastal town of Junieh , where it remained until its deployment in Cilicia .[70]
At this juncture, the Legion d'Orient was renamed the Legion Arménienne. British and French naval vessels carried its battalions to Cilicia . The First, Second and Third battalions went ashore at Mersin and were stationed in Mersin , Tarsus , Adana Alexandretta . Its units were deployed in Deort Yol, Osmaniye, and Baghche, where skirmishes occurred with Turkish armed bands.[71]
The French military command in Cilicia had stationed several Algerian units of the Ninth Tirailleurs in and around the port city of Alexandretta Cilicia , states that the Turkish population of the city had established friendly relations with the Muslim Algerian soldiers and incited hatred and intolerance among them against the Armenian volunteers.[72]
On February 10, 1919, a small fist fight between Armenian volunteers and Algerian soldiers turned into a shooting match that continued for three days and resulted in the death of fourteen Armenians and several Algerians. Although the Algerians were as much to blame for the incident, the French put the whole fault on the "undisciplined" Armenian soldiers and arbitrarily disarmed and discharged the four hundred soldiers of the tenth and thirteenth companies of the Fourth Armenian battalion.[73] The disarming and discharging of the Armenian volunteers came at a crucial moment when every single French soldier was desperately needed to bring Cilicia under the control of the newly established French administration. Numerous Turkish and Kurdish armed bands were terrorizing the population between Ayas and Osmaniye and hindering Armenian refugees from returning to their towns and villages.[74]
Although much of the change in French attitude toward the Armenians should be attributed to French politicians in Paris France Constantinople , stresses the fact that bribe taking, a centuries old Ottoman habit, was a major problem for the French and had infested their virtues. He also underlines what he calls "a policy of harems" which Turks employed to win over some French officers. Paillares writes: “The [Turkish] Pashas and Beys opened wide the doors of their villas and presented their beautiful unveiled women to the greedy young [French] officers.”[76]
Armenian volunteers were told that they had been deployed in Cilicia as liberators of a region that was to be theirs. In their memoirs, some volunteers find it irrational to be branded as culprits who were punished and discharged for allegations advanced by Ottoman officials questioning their behavior. Armenian soldiers were stunned when the French administration prevented them from rescuing Armenian women and children who were taken in by Turks during the 1915 deportations and were forcibly Turkified.[77] Armenian volunteers, most of whom were uneducated, could not have grasped the subtle complexities of French foreign diplomacy, which was propelled by political and economic interests and considerations rather than noble principles. “Our every move” concludes one volunteer, “even as harmless as it may have been, was considered an undisciplined act and we were severely punished for it. The French had only one-way with which to silence us, to disarm and discharge us from our duties. They did just that. They dismantled all the Armenian units stationed from Bozanti to Yenije and brought in their Algerian units instead.”[78]
The French tried to defend their actions by stating that disciplinary measures against Armenian volunteers were necessary in order not to alienate those Turks that were opposed to Kemal and could be won over. By silencing Armenian soldiers and by discharging them en masse, the French military command not only weakened the already feeble French occupation forces, but also gave the Kemalist bands the opportunity to intensify their attacks on Armenian villages and French garrisons and to win the support of the Turkish population whom the French were ostensibly campaigning to win over.[79]
Armenian soldiers had numerous other reasons to distrust the French administration. Foremost among these was the fact that by mid-1919 the French had not only discharged more than half the volunteers, but also neglected their previous promise of recruiting new ones for the Armenian Legion and raising the number of its soldiers to twelve thousand men.[80]
Moreover, during their military service, the Armenian soldiers were deprived of many of the rights that regular French and even Algerian soldiers enjoyed. They were classified as “assisting soldiers." Their pay was much less than regular French soldiers, even though their serving contract stated that they were to be paid on an equal basis with regular French soldiers. In his memoirs, Boyadjian argues that the French allocated less money and materials to the Armenian Legion than necessary for regular operation. As a result of this neglect, Armenian volunteers faced severe shortages in food, clothing, communication devices, and means of transportation.[81]
Perhaps more aggravating was the fact that the Armenian battalions were deprived of an Armenian officer corps. The French officers who were assigned to these battalions turned a deaf ear to the problems that Armenian soldiers encountered. The Legion had only four Armenian officers with the rank of non-commissioned lieutenants who had earned their ranks even before joining the Armenian force.[82]
The Legion also had a score of soldiers with the rank of sergeant. “It is unfortunate,” writes John Shishmanian, an American Armenian and one of the four officers,” that there are several educated soldiers among the Armenian volunteers who should have been considered for the rank of lieutenant after almost two years of service in the French army.”[83]
The disarming and discharging of Armenian soldiers also resulted in the resignation of other Armenian legionnaires. Many of the discharged volunteers left Cilicia . Those who preferred to remain were soon recruited into the Armenian guard units that were formed under the guidance of the Armenian National Union, a central body entrusted with the task of regulating and defending Armenian communal life in Adana
Mihran Damadian, who served in Cilicia as the representative of the Delegation of Integral Armenia from June 1919 to August 1920, worked hard to stop Armenian volunteers from resigning. He entreated them not to be demoralized by the change in French attitude. In a circular addressed to Armenian volunteers and printed in the local Armenian newspapers on July 24, 1919, Damadian asked the Armenian legionnaires not to leave their posts, since their mission was not yet accomplished. Damadian also advised the Armenian volunteers to obey their French commanders, “because soldiers are to obey and not to criticize orders."[85]
Damadian’s work was complemented by that of the Union of Armenian Legionnaires. Armenian officers who held the executive posts in this Union worked desperately to keep the First, Second, and Third Armenian battalions intact immediately after the French summarily discharged the Armenian volunteers of the Fourth battalion. Numerous circulars advised and even urged Armenian volunteers not to resign.[86] Despite these efforts, by mid-1919 the Armenian Legion was reduced to about five hundred men. This small force was then put under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Fly-Sainte-Marie who replaced Lieutenant Colonel Romieu. No effort on the part of the French administration was made thereafter to revive the Armenian battalions.
Thus, after only six months of deployment in Cilicia , the French rendered the Armenian Legion impotent. “The nucleus of the future Armenian Army,” a French reference to the Armenian Legion, was totally forgotten and was never reiterated.
As a microcosm of Armenian existence in Cilicia during 1919-1921, the Armenian Legion experienced the bitterness of shifting French policies. For France Paris
ECONOMY AND HEALTH CARE
By the time the Ottoman government surrendered to the Allies in October 1918, the country was in ruins. Like other areas of the empire, Cilicia , whose agriculture-oriented economy had suffered greatly during the war, received foreign occupation with an empty local treasury, a staggering economy, and little or no agricultural production. The deportation of much of its population in 1915 had resulted in the closing of businesses and had caused severe cuts in cotton and other agricultural production.
During their occupation of Cilicia , the French regarded the province as a financial liability, especially as the French economy was itself facing major difficulties because of the huge wartime military expenditures. The French administration had to obtain the necessary funds for Armenian repatriation, the maintenance of the Armenian Legion and the several French and Algerian units stationed in the province, and the feeding of a population of almost four hundred thousand, most of whom were unable to produce sufficient food for at least one full year. However, as one French author puts it, if properly attended to, the natural and agricultural resources of Cilicia would, in the very immediate future, enable it not only to be self sufficient, but even to pump cash into the French treasury and supply French markets with cheap products.[87]
The French, however, never thought of Cilicia as a profitable enterprise. Had they had the patience and the intention to plan and organize the economy in Cilicia on an equal basis with that of Syria or the Lebanon
According to both Ottoman and European prewar statistics, Cilicia was one of the richest provinces in the empire. At a time when the Ottoman government was sinking under the pressure of its European debt, the Cilician economy, based on the exportation of its agricultural products (cotton, tobacco, and cereals) was thriving. Many European enterprises had local branches in the province. France
With almost 2,600,000 hectares of arable land [89], Cilicia produced and exported 100,000 tons of cereals and 120,000 bales of cotton per annum.[90] Interestingly enough, during the first year of French occupation (1919), cereal production had dropped by 50 percent compared to prewar production. Cotton production during the same year was estimated at five to six thousand bales.[91]
During 1919, lumber production, once a profitable enterprise, was reduced to a small fraction of its prewar volume. The valley of the Jihun River
Cilicia accommodated some five hundred miles of railway that traversed the province of Adana Constantinople was accessible through the Bozanti-Yenije line. Before the war, the railway system was a profitable government owned business. Although this system was operable when the French occupied the province, shortages in personnel, poor repairs and, most importantly, lack of security rendered it unprofitable and a liability.[92]
The ports of Mersin , Alexandretta , Ayas, and Payas could not operate at full capacity because of the damage they had sustained from repeated Allied naval bombardments during the war.[93]
Basing his information on statistics published in Constantinople in 1912, Pierre Andre Redan estimates the population of Cilicia (that is, the provinces of Adana , excluding Marash and Aintab at around 400,000[94] of which 215,000 were Christians (Armenians, Greeks, Chaldians, Assyrians, Syrians, and Maronites) and 185,000 Muslims (Arabs, Turks, Tatars, Kurds, and Cherkez).[95] During the first six months of 1919, 120,000 Armenians repatriated to Cilicia . Their approximate distribution is shown in table 1.
| CITY | REPATRIATES |
| Hadjin | 8,000 |
| Hasan-Beyli | 1,000 |
| Osmaniye | 1,000 |
| Islahie | 1,000 |
| Baghche | 1,000 |
| Deort-Yol | 22,000 |
| Missis | 1,500 |
| | 3,000-4,000 |
| | 2,000-3,000 |
| Sis | 6,000-7,000 |
| | 60,000 |
TOTAL | 106,500-109,500 |
Table 1[96]
Armenian repatriation to
.
The refugees clustered in Adana France had a moral obligation towards those refugees whom the British -- and to some extent French authorities in Syria -- had literally dumped into Adana
Although the French administration tried to revive agriculture by reopening the Turkish Agricultural Bank and by creating chambers of commerce in Adana, Mersin, and other cities, [98] by the end of 1919 only half of the tillable lands were cultivated. During 1920, this ratio declined to one twentieth.[99]
Taxes presented yet another problem. Although the population had not paid any tribute for four years, the French were unable to collect back taxes, nor were they, in accordance with the terms of the armistice, allowed to raise taxes or impose new ones to generate revenues. The Turks always managed to avoid taxes. Repatriating Armenians were exempt since they were deported from Cilicia in 1915 and, therefore, had produced nothing taxable. Moreover, repatriating Armenians needed at least a year in order to be able to raise crops and pay taxes.
Inflation rates were high in postwar Cilicia . Basic foods and everyday necessities had inflation rates ranging from 600 to 800 percent. The price of bread rose from 2-3 Turkish piasters (T.p. hereafter. 100 T.p. = 1 Turkish pound = 10 French francs) to 14-15, that of meat from 8-10 T.p. to 40-50, that of sugar from 6-7 T.p. to 50-55. [100] Middle and low-income families were left without homes because of the acute shortage in rented lodgings. The annual rent of a single room apartment had risen from 120-160 to 1,000 Turkish pounds.[101]
It was natural that, against such high inflation rates, wages should increase too. They did, yet only in moderate proportions. The French administration’s efforts to control inflation were futile. As an employer, it was normal that the French administration would not be in favor of raising wages. Yet, as the acting government of the province, it had to regulate labor and look after the welfare of the people under its control. It was because of this responsibility that the French administration had to give in to popular demands and allow a moderate increase in salaries. The regulation of labor and daily wages was implemented through an official order issued by the French administration. The Order, which adjusted wages according to age group and field of labor, was published in the local newspapers. It stated:
Taking into consideration the raise in monthly wages let it be known to all what the chief-of-administration [Colonel Bremond] has established as a final list of daily wages. The authorities also announce that starting on October 10 [1919], all those who are being paid in excess of this wage list will be subject to imprisonment.[102]
The order then lists the categories of daily wages: "Boys 25-30 T.p., construction and other laborers 50-60 T.p., foremen 90-100 T.p., masons 140-150 T.p., stone cutters 160 T.p., miners 70-80 T.p., mechanics 140-160 T.p., drivers 80-90 T.p."
The order concludes by stating: "Those wages can be increased by up to 15 percent, if working conditions require such an increase. All such increases, however, must first be approved by the French administration.[103]
Laborers, who constituted the majority of the population, received the lowest wages, and, consequently, were unable to meet the basic needs of their families. They and their families had no other choice but to move and live in the tent cities.
The Davros newspaper, whose issues contain numerous articles on the acute economic problems of Cilicia , states that the French administration did not attempt to find permanent solutions to these problems. As the official organ of the Social Democrat Hnchakian Party, Davros addressed important issues such as labor regulation, the formation of labor unions, higher wages, and fewer working hours. [104]
Although Turks living in the cities of the plain were more or less faced with similar problems, most Muslims in Cilicia were peasants still living on their lands and able to earn a livelihood. The volume of agricultural production in 1919 and 1920 tends to imply that Turks, who possessed most of the cultivable land, did not produce what was expected of them. In 1919, for example, Muslims cultivated 50 percent of the arable lands. Although this percentage was enough to sustain the population, cereal shortages in the cities was so critical that French authorities had to import large quantities of grain. Because of Kemalist incursions, only one-twentieth of all arable lands were cultivated in 1920, even though the French administration provided the means for a good agricultural season. [105] On November 28, 1919, for example, the French administration announced that in order to help peasants in Cilicia, the French High Commissariat in Beirut, as a gesture of friendship, was sending 2,700 tons of good quality seeds to boost cereal production and that an initial shipment of 700 tons had already reached the port of Mersin and would soon be distributed.[106]
The ports of Cilicia seem to have been a major source of uninterrupted revenue for the French administration. November 1919 figures show that the ports at Mersin and Alexandretta provided a combined customs income of almost 4,000,000 French Francs. The French administration estimated that the two ports would provide an annual income of at least 30,000,000 Francs. [107] Col. Bremond reckons that taxes and an organized railway might have provided an additional annual income of 40,000,000 Francs, thus establishing an annual spending budget of some 70,000,000 francs. [108] French authorities in Cilicia undertook the task of improving facilities in the major ports. They invested heavily in the port at Mersin
The seriousness of the French endeavor is manifested in the amounts that were spent for the purpose of expanding the Port of Mersin Cilicia 's other ports as well. At the time new facilities were built at Mersin , expansion projects were underway at Alexandretta , Ayas, and Payas.
It is logical to assume that the French had to invest in railroads as a link between the ports and the interior of the province. In reality, however, French investment in improving and reorganizing the existing railway system was negligible compared to their heavy investment in the ports. The reason for this was that the French administration had only the coastal strip under its control. The same, however, could not be said of the interior where the railroad was under constant attack by Kemalist elements.
It was because of the lack of security that the majority of repatriating Armenians were obliged to dwell in areas that were under the protection of the French occupation forces. Only a handful of Armenians ventured to live in villages situated north of the cities of Adana , Mersin , Tarsus
Armenian merchants reestablished their import-export businesses.[111] The Orozdi Baak Armenian corporation is a good example in this regard. One of the major distributors of fabrics throughout the province before the war, this corporation reopened its doors immediately after the establishment of the French administration in Cilicia . It became one of the main suppliers of the French occupation army and employed several hundred Armenians. [112]
Many factories reopened their doors after the war. They employed hundreds of Armenians and stimulated the provincial economy. Some of the important factories in this category appear in table 2.
Corporation | Specialization | Number of Employees |
| Tripani | Weaving and cotton products. | 400 |
| Simeon Oglu | Cotton processing | 350 |
| Bodur Oglu | Cotton processing; later, production of flour (35 tons daily capacity) | 60 |
| Ashekian | (unknown) | 40 |
| Régie de Tabac | Tobacco production | 200 |
Table 2[113]
The Armenian newspapers printed in Cilicia during 1919-1921 carry numerous advertisements by merchants and importers announcing the availability of tractors for agricultural purposes, buses for local transportation, and "transport services" (group taxis) for traveling to Syria and Lebanon. Naval vessels operating through the ports of Mersin and Alexandretta accommodated sea travel. Davros, for example, carries detailed tariff lists for land and sea travel in its issues.[114]
Sanitation and health care
Many doctors and medical practitioners had by 1919 reopened their clinics in Adana , Mersin , Tarsus , Deort-Yol and Alexandretta . Twenty-five doctors (twenty Armenians and five Turks) served in the three major hospitals of Adana
Although the French administration had appointed a special committee to look after and find solutions to sanitation problems in the Armenian camps, the refugee shelters remained hazardous places that lacked basic sanitation requirements. Open sewers and pools of dirty water were dreadful features in those shanty shelters. [116]
Davros, on November 20, 1919, ran an article titled “Adana From a Hygienic Perspective” in which the editor criticized the French administration and the Armenian National Union for not paying attention to the sanitary needs of Adana
No doubt the French administration's views were different. Although it accepted the fact that health conditions were not up to its expectations, it foresaw no immediate danger.[118] According to the reports of the French administration, Adana municipality of Adana
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE
In a matter of months after the establishment of the French Civil Administration in Cilicia Armenian social and political institutions were reorganized. Armenian benevolent organizations reopened schools. French, Swiss, and American missionaries reestablished their schools and administered several orphanages that sheltered thousands of orphans.
On the political scene, perhaps the most important achievement of Armenians in Cilicia during this period was the formation of the Armenian National Union. This central body acted as an unofficial Armenian government. It included representatives from the three Armenian religious denominations as well as the four Armenian political parties. Despite the strong competition among the political parties and the cultural, educational, and social committees that each had distinctly formed, the uniqueness of the circumstances and the experience of the previous years necessitated a strong sense of unity. The political parties and the church worked hand in hand with the French administration. [121]
Before being dispatched to Cilicia , Damadian was instrumental in galvanizing worldwide moral and financial support for the formation of the Armenian Legion. While in Cilicia , Damadian not only regulated relations between Armenians and the French administration, but became the motivating force behind the social, cultural, and educational achievements of the community. He worked relentlessly to generate solidarity among the competing Armenian political parties.[122]
Education
The newly created Armenian National Union in Adana Adana
Although it is hard to find similar statistics for other cities in Cilicia, it is clear that schools opened in Mersin , Tarsus , Deort-Yol, Osmaniye, Alexandretta , and elsewhere. The French administration allocated sums that were necessary to reopen all prewar French missionary schools. Moreover, a special order from the office of the chief-of-administration stated that the teaching of the French language was to be mandatory in all schools.[125]
Many Turkish schools also benefited from the peace and welcomed students. Turkish schools, however, had not suffered as much as Armenian and other Christian schools. Turkish educational institutions had practically operated on a regular basis during the war and were only closed for a short period during 1918. Armenian schools, however, were closed for the entire war and resumed their duties only in 1919. Several years of neglect had brought costly damage to the buildings that needed huge sums to rebuilt and renovate. The French administration was helpful in this regard. It allocated sums to revive not only Armenian and other Christian schools (Greek, Arab) but Turkish ones as well. [126] Some twelve thousand Armenian students were registered at schools operating through the efforts of the Armenian community. [127]
Armenian orphanages provided shelter and served as educational institutions. During the war, Armenian children in Cilicia had had a higher chance of survival than their counterparts in historical Armenia Mersin , Urfa , and Aleppo Adana , Sis (Kozan), Hadjin, Deort-Yol, Osmaniye, Harouniye, Tarsus , Mersin , Marash, and Aintab . The total number of orphans admitted was more than ten thousand.[130]
Inter-party rivalry within the Armenian community was spreading even in the school system and was causing friction between students in the upper classes. This obliged the Special Educational Committee (formed by the Armenian National Union for the purpose of organizing education in Cilicia) to initiate counter-propaganda in the local Armenian Newspapers to assert that Armenian schools in Cilicia were academic institutions and not podiums for political parties to propagate their ideology or policy positions. [131]
The issue of teacher salaries was one of the major problems the Educational Committee had to face. The minutes of the committee show that complaints presented by teachers and salary related issues in general were a permanent topic on the agenda. During the 1919-20 scholastic years--the last for Armenian students in Cilicia--the seven Armenian schools in Adana
According to official statistics published by the French administration in Cilicia, six Turkish schools operated in Adana
Organizations and the Press
The issues of Davros impart the message that there was a conscious effort on the part of Armenians to promote their culture and social life in all ways possible. Numerous theatrical performances, public lectures, and musical recitals highlighted Armenian cultural life. The three reestablished presses in Adana and Mersin
It seems though that this tempered renaissance in education, culture, and political awareness was a product of the competition between the Armenian political parties, which tried to win over Armenians through political rallies and lectures that dealt with the political issues of the day such as the French occupation of Cilicia, the possibility of establishing an autonomous Armenian entity under French mandate, or an American mandate. The Armenian parties competed with each other not only in the sphere of politics, but even in the cultural and social realms by establishing their own cultural organizations and Armenian Red Cross committees for social work. The latter was the medium through which Armenian women participated in the reorganization of the community.
Aside from the party-oriented socio-cultural structures, there were at least a dozen other cultural or social organizations operating in Adana Adana Adana
Four Armenian political parties had regional central committees in Adana Adana
The central committees of the four Armenian political parties formed an inter-party council that worked in conjunction with the Armenian National Union. In general, the role of the Armenian political parties in Cilicia during 1919-21 was organizational.[140] All four worked to normalize conditions for a productive Armenian communal life. Party newspapers ran politically oriented editorials, articles in which the idea of Cilician autonomy was strongly defended and the change in French policy emphatically criticized. Yet the political activities of the Armenian parties never passed beyond the limits of the written word, although Turkish sources speak of Armenian Komitajis (revolutionaries) who terrorized Turkish villages. The weakness of Armenian parties in Cilicia must be attributed to the fact that these were organizations that had themselves repatriated to Cilicia in 1919 and had to start anew. Although they had their input in advising Armenians about the political issues of the day and also made them aware of the gradually fermenting idea of an autonomous Cilicia, overall, their role remained marginal in the events that were to shape Cilicia 's fate.[141]
Between 1919 and 1921, several non-partisan Armenian newspapers and periodicals were published in Cilicia . Most important among these were: 1- Arara, the organ of the Union of Armenian Legionaries. Haik Mosdikian financed it. Keghard-Shara was its editor; 2- Nor Ashkharh (New World ) owned by Matios Yeretsian. Only few issues were published; 3- Adana Tarsus
Newspapers with limited circulation appeared for short periods of time in Deort-Yol (Sisvan, published in 1920), Anitab (Sharzhum, the organ of the Hnchakian Student Association in the city), and Marash (Rahvira Mentor, a bilingual published in Armenian and Turkish). Several Turkish newspapers were published in Cilicia during 1919-21 as well.[142]
The Armenian newspapers published in Cilicia devoted their pages to articles dealing with social, political, and cultural aspects of Armenian communal life. Topics ranged from complex political matters such as relations with the French administration or analysis concerning Cilicia's future and the Peace Conference in Paris to statistical reports about schools, social and cultural events, and conditions relating to the Armenian refugee population in Adana and the other cities (especially when thousands of new refugees were brought from Marash and Sis due to the retreat of the French forces to the south of the Mersin-Osmaniye railway line as a result of the 28 May, 1920 truce with the Kemalists).
The French administration, however, implemented a strong policy of censorship on Armenian as well as Turkish newspapers in Cilicia during 1919-21.
THE TORNY ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE
Armenian, French, and even Turkish sources regard Mihran Damadian, the representative of the Paris-based Delegation of Integral Armenia in Cilicia , as a central figure in Cilician politics between 1919 and 1921. He was dispatched to Cilicia with the dual task of organizing the Armenian community and representing it before the French administration. Damadian arrived in Adana
Mihran Damadian
The fifty-five years old Armenian functionary had a long record of achievements as a schoolteacher, revolutionary, and a Hnchakian Party leader. He was involved in revolutionary activities in Sasun (1894) and Constantinople during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and had to flee to Europe to escape imprisonment. He remained in Europe for several years during which he audited university courses and acquired a speaking knowledge of French, English, and Italian. Upon his return, he devoted himself to teaching and also held administrative positions as inspector of education in Cilicia--where he had been a teacher in Adana from 1882 to 1884--and the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire .[143]
Boghos Nubar Pasha, one of the two heads of the Delegation of Integral Armenia, wrote to Damadian urging him to accept the position as the representative of the Delegation in Cilicia . Damadian--who had joined the ranks pf the Ramgavar Party after 1908 and had attained a leading position within it--received Nubar Pasha's letter in Alexandria, Egypt, in mid-1918, after having returned from a long tour of duty in Europe and the United states where he had addressed the Armenian communities and had managed to allocate sums needed for transporting Armenian volunteers from the United States and Europe to Egypt, the projected headquarters of the Legion d'Orient. [144]
The first problem that Damadian had to face upon his arrival in Adana
As the representative of an Armenian delegation with no tangible political power or financial resources, Damadian was assigned the difficult task of creating unity within a community that was divided along religious, political, social, and even compatriotic lines. It was even more difficult to be entrusted with the chores of representing this fragmented community and to defend its rights before the French administration.
French administrators and military commanders such as Colonel Bremond and General Dufieux praise Damadian for his tact, patience, endurance and readiness to cooperate with French authorities in what was beneficial for Armenians in general. It was because of his motivation to secure peace and tranquility in Cilicia that Damadian agreed to meet with several Turkish notables when asked to do so by Col. Bremond. The French administration considered these meetings important and regarded them as a first step towards an Armeno-Turkish dialogue that would, in turn, decrease ethnic tensions and normalize the situation.
On the subject of the envisaged Armeno-Turkish dialogue, Damadian writes that he had several meetings with Turkish notables whose names he fails to mention. “ . . . But aside from a mutual understanding on a personal level,” he concludes, “ . . .a general agreement or a total political solution for Armenian-Turkish relations is not yet feasible," since “ . . .both parties remain attached to their unique political platforms with respect to the future of Cilicia". [147]
In a letter addressed to Damadian, Colonel Bremond urged him not to give up hope and to continue his efforts to find a middle ground with the Turks so that the vali, Jelal Bey, would not be able to win them over to the Kemalist cause. In the same letter, Bremond also underlined the importance of an Armeno-Turkish agreement in Cilicia , since it would:
1. Damage Kemal’s popularity among Turks,
2. Cut an important source of income for Kemal, and
3. Oblige Kemalist forces to abandon their dreams concerning Cilicia .[148]
The importance with which the French followed the issue of an Armeno-Turkish agreement is once again underlined in the same letter, when Bremond asks Damadian not to halt the negotiations and to be present at a meeting to be held in the headquarters of the French administration on April 17, 1920, after which “ . . .a declaration concerning an Armeno-Turkish agreement will be made public by the chief-of-administration.” [149]
Damadian's role in Cilicia was somewhat eclipsed after the independence act of August 5, 1920. He remained in Cilicia for almost a year after the French administration severed all official ties with him. [150] His activities, however, were centered on the Armenian community. He was instrumental in organizing the defense of Adana
Perhaps the most important document, which demonstrates Damadian’s organizational abilities, is the extensive report he submitted to the Delegation of Integral Armenia in 1919 concerning the defense of Cilicia against a very probable Kemalist incursion.[151] The report proposed dividing Cilicia into five defense zones: Adana
1. General and regional commands;
2. Military committees to look after the Armenian legionaries;
3. A committee for supplies and means of transportation;
4. A committee for sanitary and health needs;
5. A committee for public relations;
6. A committee for post and communications;
7. A general treasury;
8. A military court. [153]
Obviously, Damadian's report stresses the importance of having a fully equipped occupation army in Cilicia . In his view this could have been achieved only through the concerted efforts of the French administration and the Armenian community. However, since the French sabotaged Franco-Armenian cooperation by discharging the already existing Armenian battalions, hopes of bringing Damadian's defense project to fruition or of creating an Armenian army of ten thousand men -- which was, in Damadian’s view, possible even through local means--were futile.[154] Damadian failure must be attributed to the chaotic state of affairs in Cilicia and the marked change in French policy towards Armenians. [155]
The Armenian National Union
During 1919-21, a new national institution, the Armenian National Union, was growing out of the unique circumstances of Armenian life in Cilicia . After their repatriation, Armenians formed this body to bring a sense of cohesion to their community. Although Armenian national unions were formed in Egypt , Europe, and the United States Cilicia , the newly established National Union was entrusted with the task of organizing and governing of the Armenian community. That the National Union was a de facto Armenian government is clearly demonstrated in the bylaws of the union which state that:
Cilicia, as an occupied territory, has no defined governmental system; therefore, until a new decision is reached, the Armenian National Unions will act as national-civil administrations that will govern the Armenian communities in Cilicia .[157]
During the first months of Armenian repatriation to Cilicia , national unions were formed in all the cities where Armenian communities existed. The city chapters were in turn connected to a central executive body that resided in the provincial capital Adana
Damadian, who was instrumental in the formulation of the bylaws, managed to create a body that was to be the centre around which all Armenian activities in Cilicia would function. The central body in Adana and its chapters in Mersin , Tarsus Adana from where sums were allocated to projects in Adana Cilicia . On several occasions, Damadian served as liaison between the Union and the French administration.
The central body residing in Adana
The Committee for Financial resources, for example, created a subcommittee and entrusted it with the task of fining and documenting Armenian properties that were taken over by the Turks after the deportations. It was this subcommittee that accepted, prepared, and brought cases of property repossession before the French Arbitrating Court
Another subcommittee that the Financial Resources Committee initiated was that of rent control and the maintenance of national-communal properties. This subcommittee worked to regulate and tabulate rents and to enforce its own decisions.[162] As to the maintenance of communal properties, the subcommittee kept an updated list of such properties and, through the Financial Resources Committee, allocated sums for repairs and reconstruction. In 1920, for example, the subcommittee insured fifteen communal properties (schools, churches, and others) with French and Italian companies. For that purpose, it spent no less than two million French francs.[163]
The Committee on Social-Religious Affairs regulated and organized the business of the Armenian Prelacy, the churches under its jurisdiction, and the church properties that were entrusted to the Prelacy. The subcommittee on charity provided food and shelter to widows and orphans living in the camps and tent cities.[164] The activities of this subcommittee were centered on the refugee camps in Adana
Although the French administration initially cooperated with the Armenian National Union and through it allocated sums for the needy and, furthermore, allowed it to collect taxes on its behalf, this cooperation did not last for long. By assuming governmental obligations that were in the jurisdiction of the French administration, the Armenian National Union was--from the perspective of the French administration-- intruding on others’ rights. Apparently, the French administration was in no position to tolerate the existence of a government operating within a government. On its part, the Armenian National Union justified its position as filling the administrative gap that the feeble French administration could not.
As was the case with the representative of the Delegation of Integral Armenia, relations between the French administration and the Armenian National Union worsened immediately after the declaration of Cilicia ’s independence on August 5, 1920. During the rest of 1920 and throughout 1921 internal problems incapacitated the Armenian National Union. Collective resignations, inter-party intrigues, and ineffective, short-lived central bodies became common. The Union was almost nonexistent during the last months of Armenian presence in Cilicia .
The year 1920 was a crucial one for Armenians in Cilicia . The beginning of that year saw the retreat of the French from Marash and the subsequent death of thousands of Armenians. In March, the Armenian stronghold of Hadjin was put under siege by Kemalist forces. It was to withstand Turkish incursions for eight months only to be occupied and its Armenian inhabitants either killed or exiled.[165]
The May 28 truce resulted in the handing over of Anitab to the Kemalists, the retreat of the French occupation forces south of the Mersin-Osmaniye railway line, and the subsequent evacuation of thousands of Armenians from Sis and its environs. Yet, amazingly, Armenians were still entertained with the idea of an autonomous Cilicia under a French mandate.
The French, on their part, doubted Armenian activities. This doubt originated, to a great extent, from the activities of the Paris-based Delegation of Integral Armenia, which, in its negotiations with the Allies, had on several occasions implied about French or a possible American mandate over Cilicia . The French, who were at the time entertaining the idea of incorporating Cilicia within their Syrian mandate, had enough reasons to doubt such Armenian activities. French doubts were furthered when the King-Crane and Harbord Commissions visited Cilicia and hopes for an American mandate surfaced once more within the Armenian community.[166]
The Peace Negotiations in Paris
By mid-1920, the Peace Conference in Paris Cilicia 's independence was undertaken. The fact that this act was staged just five days before the signing of the Peace Treaty at Sevres (10 August, 1920) is yet another indication of the desperate situation of Armenians and other Christian peoples in Cilicia.
Christians in Cilicia in general and Armenians in particular were unaware of how negotiations were progressing in Paris Cilicia cabled a petition to the Peace Conference on May 21, 1920. [167] The petition stressed that:
1. Geographically, Cilicia belongs neither to Anatolia nor to Syria
2. Christians in Cilicia constitute the majority of the population;
3. Turks are a minority within the Muslim population of the province.[169]
On the basis of these points, the representatives of the Christian communities urged the Allied powers to use their common sense and, for the sake of Cilicia's 250,000 Christians,[170] not to hand the province over to the Turks, since it was illogical to offer the Turkish minority the privilege of ruling over a Christian majority.[171]
In an effort to show the strategic importance of Cilicia , the petitioners underlined the fact that:
. . . no peace can be achieved in the Near East, and Pan-Islamism can not be contained, unless Turkish and Arab lands are separated by a Christian Cilicia, as the Republic of Armenia is destined to serve as a buffer between the two centers of Pan-Islamism , Turkey , and Azerbaijan
The fear of a possible return to Turkish rule was not exaggerated. It was in the beginning of May 1920 that Reshad Effendy, the representative of the Ottoman government at the Peace Conference, urged Turks in Cilicia to be calm and not to engage in acts of hostility against the French occupiers, since their departure from Cilicia was only a matter of time.[173] The Turkish vali in Adana Cilicia . Moreover, it seems that at the time there was a certain amount of misunderstanding among the French officials concerning the state of affairs in Cilicia and the possible return of the province to Turkish rule. Several French officials in Beirut , for example, seemed to be dissatisfied with the way their government or the Allies in general were dealing with issues relating to Cilicia . Some sources admit that Damadian orchestrated the act of the declaration of Cilicia's independence on receiving information from a certain Dr. Malezian who was in the employment of the French High Commissioner in Beirut Paris Cilicia ." [174] It seems also that Colonel Bremond had, on several occasions, encouraged Damadian that the time was right for Armenians to make their “move.”[175] This “much-advised” Armenian “move” was staged on August 5, 1920. On August 4, the representatives of the Christian denominations in Cilicia issued a proclamation declaring Cilicia independent under a French mandate.
Two Acts of Independence
Actually, there were not one but two acts of declaration of Cilicia ’s independence. The first act was staged by Minas Veradzin, a member of the Central Committee of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the editor of Giligia, the party's organ. On August 2, 1920, Veradzin single handedly declared the area between the Sihun and the Jihun Rivers independent under a French mandate. The declaration of the independence of the “Rupenian Republic ” (Rupen being the prince who had founded the medieval Armenian principality of Cilicia ]) read as follows:
Today, August 2, 1920, in the presence of our forces [?], I declare the area between the Sihun and Jihun Rivers Europe would not heed to our call, we will continue to fight the Kemalists with all our force.[176]
Veradzin's declaration complicated matters. It did not, however, stop Armenians from undertaking a more comprehensive move three days later. The French administration sent its forces to Veradzin’s “independent republic” and brought the area under its control.[177] Upon the request of the French administration Veradzin was ousted from the Armenian National Union. The French authorities immediately exiled him.[178]
The Armenian National Union had discussed the idea of an act of independence during a series of meetings held between June and July 1920. These discussions led to the formation of a second body, the Supreme National Council, which was entrusted with the task of preparing a plan of action if such a venture was to be undertaken. Yet not all Armenian factions were in favor of such an act. Many argued that it would surely create friction between Armenians and the French at a time when French friendship was much needed. The Armenian Constitutional Democratic (Ramgavar) Party, for example, during a meeting of its functionaries held on July 31, 1920, passed a resolution in which it considered declaring independence a “premature” act that is “condemned to failure.” [179] The party also stressed that “if the French authorities oppose such an act, the project of the formation of an Armenian military force to aid Hadjin would be seriously jeopardized.”[180]
During a meeting of the Supreme National Council, Veradzin proposed a plan to reoccupy Sis, which the Kemalists had already brought under their control. Veradzin's plan called for the retaking of the city and declaring Cilicia ’s independence from there. This was important since by declaring independence in an area other than that which was still under French control would, to a great extent, minimize French antagonism to the concept of Cilicia 's independence. [181]
Nevertheless, on August 4, 1920, the representatives of the Christian communities met and issued the statement in which they declared Cilicia independent and under French mandate.[182] The meeting also entrusted Damadian with the task of handing the statement over to the French authorities. In the evening of the same day, Damadian gave an unexpected visit to Colonel Bremond who promised to cable the contents of the statement to Beirut
It is not clear whether Bremond's not keeping his word or the excitement within the Armenian National Union and the Supreme National Council led to the events of August 5, 1920. Accompanied by the members of his newly formed cabinet, Damadian occupied the Konak (government building) only to be forced out several hours later by French soldiers acting on orders from the chief-of-administration, Col. Bremond. [184]
Thus ended the short-lived declaration of Cilicia ’s independence and the “coup d'etat” that was to secure its implementation. Five days later, on August 10, the Peace Treaty was signed at Sevres. Armenian ambitions for the creation of an autonomous entity in Cilicia were shattered.
The two acts of Cilicia 's independence have been the source of much criticism even among Armenians. Amazingly, French sources seem to neglect the issue and consider it unimportant while Turkish sources never even bother to mention it. The critics of the declarations of independence stress that Damadian and the leaders of the Armenian National Union should have realized the shortcomings of such a futile venture. Moreover, the critics argue that Damadian should have known that Armenians were not properly equipped to impose their political will. Even if they possessed such political power, it was very probable that the French would have stopped them anyway.
Defending the act of August 5, 1920, and the subsequent “takeover” of government Damadian wrote:
Every act, political or other, which fails, is doomed to be criticized, since only achievements that are successful have a chance to be praised . . Yet, when it was evident that the course of events was by no means favorable for Armenians, I was convinced that something had to be done, even if that something was to be out of desperation. Moreover, this something was to be accomplished through available local means before the ratification of the peace treaty that surely was to render us incompetent . . . I must reiterate that I never feel sorry in that I participated in the events of August 5 [1920] . . . It must be stated, however, that we were weak, because we did everything out of love and admiration for France and the French people . . . This was the only reason why we did what we did without publicizing it. On that day [5 August, 1920], on the days before that and even today [Damadian wrote this part of his memoirs just before leaving Cilicia in July, 1921] we were the real masters of Adana
The idea of a greater Armenia (perhaps the amalgamation of the Armenian Republic in the Caucasus with an autonomous Cilicia) which the Paris-based Delegation of Integral Armenia advocated and which was bitterly attacked by the French government and the media-- in fact, the term “l'Empire Arménienne » was frequently used as part of the sarcastic campaign of the French media of the day--was not, as it seems, the focus of the Armenian leadership of Cilicia when the act of independence was staged in the beginning of August 1920. Moreover, the leaders of the Armenian Republic Paris
Outside Cilicia, the dominant idea [among Armenians] is that we want to unite this land [Cilicia] to [the Republic of] Armenia
There were no hidden reasons behind the two acts of independence. They seem to have been the result of desperation and fear of a gloomy future for Armenian presence in Cilicia . Moreover, the acts of independence were not directed against the French authorities. Yet the French administration acted as if they were by exiling Veradzin and severing all ties with Damadian and the Armenian National Union. [187]
The staging of the two acts also caused changes within the French administration in Cilicia . The Chief-of-Administration, Col. Bremond, was replaced by General Haslere who, upon his arrival in Adana
The French administration severed all ties with the Armenian National Union and all social and political organizations. After August 5, 1920, it dealt only with the Armenian Church and entrusted it with the task of regulating relations with the French authorities. This procedure continued uninterrupted until the evacuation of Armenians from Cilicia in late 1921 and early 1922. [189]
The last year of Armenian presence in Cilicia was one full of political and social problems. The Treaty of Sevres crushed all hopes of creating an Armenian entity in Cilicia . On the political scene, a Franco-Turkish rapprochement and a subsequent agreement to evacuate Cilicia seemed possible indeed. For months during 1921, Adana Adana Adana
The siege condition, coupled with acute shortages in supplies, gave way to a strong wave of en masse Armenian emigration. Although the French authorities and the Armenian leadership encouraged Armenians to stay, thousands crowded the port cities of Mersin and Alexandretta waiting for ships to carry them abroad. [192] The emigration problem compelled the Armenian leadership and the media to organize a counter campaign by disclosing the “difficulties and the desperation that emigrating Armenians were subject to in such places as Marseilles
It was under such desperate conditions that the remaining Armenians continued to defend Adana Ankara Cilicia was secured by the terms of the agreement with Kemal, no Armenian was willing to take any chances.[194]
CONCLUSION
On October 20, 1921, the French envoy to Ankara, Franklin Bouillon signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Mustafa Kemal. By signing the Ankara Accord, France and the Kemalists agreed to halt all military operations against each other and to end the state of war between them. According to the provisions of articles 3 and 8 of the agreement, the French forces were to evacuate all of Cilicia and retreat south of the Payas-Meydan Ekbes-Kilis line.[195] Thus, only the sanjak (county) of Alexandretta was to remain under French control. The rest of Cilicia was consequently traded for economic privileges and new trade possibilities that France needed in order to balance the British gains in the Levant . In any case, it was the Kemalist movement that gained from this agreement. By signing it, the French formally acknowledged the legitimacy of Kemalist Turkey
From this perspective, the Ankara Agreement was a prelude to the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) by which the fledgling Turkish Republic of Kemal gained recognition from the rest of the Allied powers thereby emerging as a strong country out of the dregs of the Ottoman Empire. By signing the Ankara Agreement, France totally neglected the aspirations of thousands of Armenians who had repatriated to Cilicia in 1919-20. By doing so, France not only forgot its previous promises of establishing an autonomous Cilicia , but also literally jettisoned Armenian interests. It was impossible for Armenians to remain in Cilicia, even though in its agreement with Kemal , France had “dictated” an article that was supposed to guarantee the rights of Armenians and other Christians in Cilicia .
When thinking about this Cilician experience, the question that asserts itself is why was it that the French finally chose to hand the province over after defending it for three years and sacrificing a great deal in terms of human resources? It is not easy to find a simple answer to such a complex question. Many factors and events spanning the three years of French occupation in Cilicia had their effect on the decision rendered.
The French administration in Cilicia neither understood the roots of the ethnic tensions between Armenians and Turks, nor the reasons behind Christian dismay of Turkish rule. In their efforts to calm the situation, the French often took measures that offended and alienated both parties thus creating an atmosphere of doubt and suspicion towards the occupiers. In the long run, this policy damaged the initial popularity of the French.
Another crucial mistake that the French committed in the Levant was that they were almost always competing against the British who, in their opinion, worked hard to diminish French gains during the postwar years. Although allegations of British intrigues were not baseless, one should not forget that the victory in the Levant was accomplished mainly through British arms.
The limited number of French forces in the Levant was perhaps the most important factor behind the shortcomings of French policies there. Most of the active French units were stationed in Syria , since France France could deploy in Cilicia was not enough to handle the difficult task of defending an area of fifty thousand square kilometers on the boundaries of which a martial enemy driven by nationalistic zeal was consolidating its power.
The French tried to solve this military handicap through diplomatic means, but in the end that worked against them. Not having sufficient forces to assume the role of an occupier, it seems that French politicians concentrated their efforts on establishing friendly relations with the Turkish population of Cilicia . This mood was most probably motivated by Paris Turkey
This somewhat defeatist French attitude was behind the visit of the French High Commissioner in the Levant, Georges Picot, to Ankara Cilicia had some bitter words for Picot in the aftermath of the visit, the damage was done and the Kemalists understood that a major French offensive was not in the cards. This consequently dwindled French prestige and its ability to exert an unequivocal will on Cilicians.[196]
On the other hand, the inadequate policies that the French administration tried to implement in Cilicia were reasons enough to render it incompetent in maintaining its control over the province. In the case of Syria Cilicia . Much to the dismay of Armenians and even some French administrators, the old Ottoman government machinery was kept intact. During 1919-21, Cilicia had two Ottoman governors one of which, Nazim Bey, was a fervent Ittihadist, while the other, Jelal Bey, was an ardent Kemalist. They facilitated the spread of Kemalist propaganda and encouraged the formation of secret Kemalist cells. They did this under the very eyes of the French administration, which practically did nothing to stop their work. Moreover, the French occupation forces were unable to disarm the Turkish bands or even the population when such an order was issued.
Apparently, such mistakes ruined the morale of Armenian and even French soldiers deployed in Cilicia . The Armenian battalions were dismantled and their soldiers discharged. There were insufficient weapons, supplies, communication instruments, and transportation means. The French soldiers and their commanders had more than once acted with gallantry and shown courage in fighting against the Kemalists. This was best witnessed in Aintab where a fistful of soldiers boldly defended the city against Kemalist incursions. Yet all that was lost because of a weak administration that had to act upon the initiatives of the High Commissioner in Beirut
From the Armenian point of view, these aspects of French policy were hints that France had already forgotten its previous engagements and was pulling out from its commitment to invest in Cilicia and its future. Yet, Armenians never tried hard enough to put a dent in French policy. Aside from the initial repatriation process no further attempts were made to extend and reorganize the repatriation effort once the French stopped financing it.
If Adana Cilicia would have been greater.
On the local scene, Armenian communal life in Cilicia had its problems too. Inter-party rivalries, the indifference of some Armenians toward the future of Cilicia, miserable refugee conditions, and economic difficulties weakened the community and the prospects of an autonomous Cilicia .
Compounded, all these mistakes led to the inevitable conclusion of closing the curtain over a three year Armenian experience in Cilicia . The last of the Armenians came out from there with the retreating French forces. Some built their homes in the sanjak (county) of Alexandretta only to move to Syria or Lebanon when it was handed over to Turkey Syria , Lebanon , and as far away as Europe and the United States
* For the purpose of this article modern Turkish transliteration is utilized only in the footnotes. Personal, locale, and publications names are reproduced to give, as much as possible, the most exact phonetic rendition and yet make reading the text easier for English speaking people. It must be noted that the essay deals with a period in history where Ottoman rather than Modern Turkish was the language in use. Also, since all Armenian personal, locale, and publications names are Western Armenian, they have been phonetically reproduced as pronounced in that dialect. The Library of Congress Armenian transliteration system (based on Eastern Armenian phonetic values) is utilized in the text and footnotes to refer to names and sources that are Eastern Armenian.
[1]Robert Farrer Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, Ph.D. dissertation (University of Utah, 1991), pp. 176-185. The French action was aimed at curbing American missionary initiatives to help Armenians resettle. This was crucial for France because of talks about an American mandate for Armenia that might also include Cilicia . With no special funds to be able to resettle Armenians, the French administration in Cilicia resorted to collecting taxes and thus meddling in what Zeidner calls the “internal affairs” of the province, thus alienating the Turkish population there.
[3] Puzant Yeghiaian ed., Adanayi Hayots Patmutiun (History of Adana France , Britain , and Russia Levant was to be divided into several zones of influence and occupation. Cilicia was to be incorporated into the French zone. After the October armistice, Britain , whose troops in the Levant far exceeded those of France , occupied Cilicia temporarily by stationing several British battalions there.
[6] Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, pp. 132-141. The order to demobilize the Turkish Yildirim Army was entrusted to Mustafa Kemal As soon an he took over control of the army from the German Marshal, Liman Von Snders (whose officers were now on the run for their lives), Kemal started contesting the articles of the armistice, especially indicating to his superiors in Istanbul the general Allenby was adding new requirements to them. Finally, Kemal left for Istanbul and in turn entrusted the evacuation of the army units, officer cadres, and, more importantly, the huge amount of guns and munitions left over by the Germans, to his inferiors who attached some of the units to existing gendarme forces in Cilicia .
[7] Recep Dalkir, Yigitlik Gunleri (Days of Heroism) (Istanbul: T.T. Postasi matbaasi, 1961), 14. See also:
Paul Du Veou, La Passion De La Cilicie, 1919-1922 (The Passion For Cilicia, 1919-1922) (Paris: Librerie Orientalist, 1954), p. 64.
[9] Edouard Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29 (Winter 1976-1977), p. 345.
[12] Dikran H. Boyadjian, Haygagan Lekeone, Badmagan Hushakrutiun (The Armenian Legion: A Historical Memoir) (Watertown: Baykar Press, 1965), pp. 190-191.
[13]Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29 (Winter 1976-1977), p. 365.
[14] Kasim Ener, Cukurova'nin Isgali Ve Kurtulus Savasi (Chukurova’s Occupation and Its War of Independence) (Istanbul: Berksoy Matbaasi, 1963), 23; Bremond, “The Bremond Mission,” p. 43.
[15]Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29 (Winter 1976-1977), 346.
[17] Pierre Andre Redan, La Cilicie et le Problem Ottoman (Cilicia and the Ottoman Problem) (Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1921), pp. 76-77.
[22] Du Veou, La Passion De La Cilicie, , p. 91; Sahakian, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p. 122.
23 Sh[mavon] T. Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, 1919-1920 (The National-Liberation Movements of Cilician Armenians, 1919-1920) (Yerevan
[27] Ibid, p. 348; Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin, 95. French sources (Bremond, Du Veau, Redan) often speak about economic difficulties that Cilicia encountered and how these were temporarily remedied by payments from the French Exchequer. See also: Robert Farrer Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, Ph.D. dissertation (University of Utah, 1991), 176-185. This is not what Zeidner tries to convey in his dissertation where he underlines the fact that France practically left Bremond on his own in terms of finding financial resources for Cilicia . It must be noted that the central Ottoman government too had promised to take care of repatriation. However, this could not be expected from an entity that was surviving through loans from the Allied powers and especially Britain
[35] Edouard Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 30, p. 35.
[37] Ener, Cukurova'nin Isgali, p.43. About the formation of the organization's cells in Cilicia see: Dalkir, Yigitlik Gunleri, pp. 64-65.
[41] Redan, La Cilicie et le Problem Ottoman, pp. 19-20. See also, Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 364.
[42] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 352. See also: Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, p. 113. French and Armenian sources (and to some extent Turkish sources) mention that Hashim Bey, head of the gendarme forces, and Nazim Bey, the vali, were instrumental in planning the uprising in Adana
[43] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 352. It is interesting to note that Zeidner calls this Armenian gendarme force a “militia.” Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, pp. 216.
[44] This had to do with the Armenian demand of the creation of an independent Armenian state incorporating Cilicia as was presented by the Joint Armenian delegation headed by Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar Pasha. This demand was severely scrutinized in French political circles and the media. The rubric “l’Empire Arménienne” was often used sarcastically as a reference to an unfathomable Armenian demand.
[46] Ibid., pp. 96-97. According to the provisions of the Mudros armistice, the Ottoman government in Constantinople was liable to pay all expenses for Armenian repatriation to Cilicia (See Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 349). It seems, however, that after a marginal initial payment, the Turkish government neglected its duties in this regard. Consequently, the French High Commissariat in Beirut was burdened with the costs of transporting Armenians from Syria to Cilicia . Bremond also states that the repatriation of Armenians to Cilicia was halted in September 1919, when the French High Commissioner stopped paying money for that purpose. It must be assumed then, that Armenian repatriation to Cilicia after September 1919 was accomplished through sums allocated by Armenian and other humanitarian organizations.
[47] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 30 (Spring 1977), p. 35.
[50] Ener, Cukurova'nin Isgali, p. 27. Kasim Ener states that after his appointment, and while still in Istanbul , the new vali, Jelal Bey, had already written to Kemalist leaders in Cilicia and informed them of his future moves. Many Kemalists greeted the new vali at the station in Adana
[54] Ibid., p. 38. Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, pp. 340-350. The French kept their withdrawal secret even from the American missionaries stationed in the city.
[55] Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, p. 250. According to Zeidner 5,000 Armenians were able to flee with the retreating French forces.
[56] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 30, pp. 38-39. In fact, it was after the fall of Marash; the intense pressure by the Kemalists on Bozanti; the initial skirmishes in Aintab ; and the first abandonment of that city that the 20 days truce of May 28 was signed between the French and the Kemalists. The truce was signed to save the French detachment in Bozanti. Bremond, however, argues (Bremond, “The Bremond Mission,” vol. 30, p. 47) that this goal was never achieved since Bozanti fell to the Kemalists anyway. Moreover, the truce alienated those Turks that opposed Kemal who put their faith in the French occupation forces. “Now," states Bremond, "they [the anti-Kemalist Turks] found themselves obliged to rally to Kemalism". Kemal did not honor the truce. In Colonel Bremond's opinion, the twenty days were enough for him to reorganize his forces and start a new offensive. On the other hand, Turkish sources regard the May 28 truce as a tactical move on the part of the French. Kasim Ener, for example, states, that it was because of this truce that the French and Armenians had the time to evacuate Is (Koran) and to organize their defenses in and around Adana
[59] Ibid., p. 37.
[64] Dikran Boyadjian, Haygakan Lekeone, Badmagan Hushakrutiun (The Armenian Legion: A Historical Memoir) (Watertown: Baykar Printing, 1965), p. 133.
[65] Guevork Gotikian, “La Legion d’Orient, Le mandate français et l’expulsion des Arméniens,” Revue d’Histoire Arménienne Contemporaine, tom III, numéro special, 1999, pp. 251-324. This lengthy article also introduces the main agreements concerning the formation of the Legion d’Orient. Especially important is the first document in the appendix (pp. 314-318, and p. 256 of the article) titled “Instruction sur l’organisation de la Légion d’Orient,” which contains a point stressing that in accordance to a special instruction soldiers serving in the Legion will have “leurs allocations, qui seront en principe equivalents a celles du soldat français.” Also, instruction No. 7.966-9/11 of November 26, 1916 mandated that besides being treated in an equivalent fashion to French soldiers, soldiers of the legion would also have their monthly salaries, pensions, and family allocations in accordance to what French soldiers were entitled to. Of course these initial agreement points were never implemented,
[70] Yeghiaian, Adanayi Hayots Patmutiun, p. 432; Kasbar Menag, Giankis Ughinerov (On The Paths of My Life) (Beirut: Shirag Press, 1968), pp. 33-34; Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus, pp. 141-144. Zeidner tries to present the Armenian legionnaires as rude and rogue soldiers who were only amused by harassing people. He states that they were not welcomed in Beirut
[73] Ibid., pp. 195-196; Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus, pp. 148, 155-158. Once again, Zeidner states that it was the Armenian soldiers who instigated fights with the local Muslims (notice the careful use of the word rather than Turks). However, he admits that one such incident started when Armenian legionnaires were trying to rescue an Armenian girl from a Turkish harem.
[82] Ibid.; those were:- Lieutenant John Shishmanian (United States); Lieutenant Vahakn Portukalian (France); Lieutenant Aspiran Vahe Sahatjian; Lieutenant Papazian ( from the French Legion Etranger).
[87] Redan, La Cilicie et le Problem Ottoman, pp. V-X. See the preface to Pierre Redan's book written by Rene Pinon.
[90] Redan, La Cilicie et le Problem Ottoman, pp. 115-116. Production figures for 1914 were, according to Yeghiayan, 150,000 bales (about 300,000 tons) of quality Cleveland
[92] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, pp. 355-356. Also see: Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Patmutiun, p. 153.
[93] Yeghiaian, Adanayi Hayots Patmutiun, pp. 154-155. According to pre-war figures, the two ports of Mersin and Alexandretta combined had an annual:
- Export volume of.............................. 1,575,300tons.
- Import volume of............................... 515,800 tons.
- Revenues from customs.................. 1,059,500 Ottoman piasters.
[100] “Hamesd Khorhrtadzutiun Oravartski Khntrin Artiv” (A Modest Thought Concerning The Daily Wage Issue), Davros, (Adana, October 15, 1919), p. 3.
[103] Ibid.
January 25, 1920), p. 1; "Pnagaranneru Hartse Adanayi Mech" (The Housing Issue in Adana
(Adana, November 3, 1920), pp. 1-2.
[107] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 355.
[108] Ibid., p. 356.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun., pp. 157-158.
[112] Ibid., p. 160.
[113] Ibid., pp. 157-158.
[114] Ibid., pp. 721-722.
[115] Ibid., p. 724. During the period under discussion there were three hospitals operating in Adana
-The Red Cross Hospital
-The American Hospital
[116] “Katsek ev Desek'” (Go and See), Davros (Adana, December 30, 1919), p. 2.
[117] “Adanan Aroghchabahagan Desagedov” (Adana
[118] Yeghiaian, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun, pp. 720-721.
[119] Ibid., p. 722.
[120] Ibid., p. 724.
[121] Ibid., p. 460.
[122] Mihran Damadian, Im Husheres (From My Memoirs) (Beirut: Zartonk Press, 1985), p. 142.
[123] Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun, p. 650.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 354.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Yeghiayan, Zhamanakakits Badmutiun Gatoghigosutian Hayots Giligio, 1914-1972, (Contemporary History of the Catholicosate of Armenians of Cilicia, 1914-1972) (Antilias: Catholicosate of Cilicia Press, , 1975), p. 97.
[129] Ibid., p. 98.
[130] Ibid., pp. 98-99.
[131] Yeghiaian, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun, p. 689.
[132] Ibid., pp. 699-706.
[133] Ibid., pp. 654-655.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid., p. 712. Four of the existing six publishing houses belonged to political parties. Two were private (one in Adana and the other in Mersin
[136] Ibid., p. 710.
[137] Ibid.
[138] “Haydararutiun” (Announcement), Davros (Adana, November 27,1920), p. 2.
[139] Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun, pp. 709-712.
[140] Ibid., p. 712.
[141] Ibid., p. 711.
[142] Damad Arikoglu, Hatiralarim (My Memoirs) (Istanbul: Tan Matbaasi, 1961), pp. 172-173. Those were: 1- Ferda (The Future, Tomorrow), owned and edited by Ali Hilmi Bey, an anti-Ittihadist Turkish liberal who was a member of the prewar Turkish I’tilaf (Mutual Agreement) Party: 2- Adana Postasi (The Adana Post) owned by Huseyin Ilham Pasha: 3- Rehber (The Guide) owned and edited by Istanbullizadeh Yusuf. When pro-Kemalist Turkish notables and agitators left Adana Adana Cilicia during 1919-1921.
[143] Damadian, Im Husheres, p. 8. See part I of Damadian's memoirs for information about his early revolutionary activities, his teaching positions, and membership in Armenian revolutionary/political parties first as a Hnchakist, then Reformist Hnchakist, and finally as a Sahmanatragan Ramgavar (Constitutional Populist).
[145] Ibid., p. 147.
[147] Mikayel Natanian, "Kilikian Husher, Badmagan Kani Me Pasdatughter," (Cilician Memoirs, Some Historical Documents), Hasg, No. 18 (October 1949), p. 293.
[149] Ibid., p. 295; Depoian, Mihran Damadian, pp. 192-194. It seems that Damadian was enthusiastic about an Armeno-Turkish agreement. He negotiated with Turkish notables under the political platform “Cilicia to Cilicians” be they Armenians, Turks or others. Damadian knew that such an agreement would benefit Cilician Armenians. For that reason he welcomed Col. Bremond's suggestion to meet and to negotiate with Turkish notables.
[150] Depoian, Mihran Damadian, p. 185. Damadian remained in Cilicia until July 18, 1921.
[151] Ibid., p. 196.
[152] Ibid., p. 197.
[153] Ibid.
[154] Ibid., p. 198.
[155] Ibid., p. 168.
[156] Mikayel Natanian, “Kilikian Husher, Varchagan Marminneru Gazmagerbchakan Ganonakirnere,” (Cilician Memoirs, The Organizational Bylaws Of The Governing Bodies), Hasg, No. 19: 299 (July-August 1950), 208-209.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Ibid., p. 210.
[159] Ibid., p. 211. Damadian presided over the meetings.
[160] Ibid., p. 212.
[161] Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p. 235; Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun, pp. 690, 693.
[162] Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun, p. 691.
[163] Ibid., p. 692.
[164] Ibid., pp. 695-696.
[165] Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, p. 177-212. In presenting the eight-month long siege and the subsequent takeover of Hadjin by the Kemalist forces Torossian relies on the memoirs of H. Terzian, published in Buenos Aires , Argentina
[166] Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, pp. 254, 279. The issue of an American mandate for Cilicia alone, or in a format whereby it is incorporated within a greater Armenian state was worrying French authorities since April 1919. Moreover, French contention to place Cilicia within their Syrian mandate was the highlight of French military thought in Beirut and Adana Constantinople were against the idea. They favored Picot’s idea of returning Cilicia to Turkey
[168] This is yet another indication of the validity of the proposal of annexing Cilicia to France
[169] Ibid., p. 189.
[170] Ibid., p. 191.
[171] Ibid., p. 189.
[172] Ibid., pp. 190-191. Depoian maintains that this statement is exaggerated, since the two ideologies (i.e. Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist) are not comparable. For a more detailed analysis on the difference between the two ideologies see also: Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study in Irredentism (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), pp. 8, 14, 17-19.
[173] Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, p. 235.
[176] Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, pp. 225-226.
[177] Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, p. 244.
[178] Damadian, Im Husheres, p. 175. Damadian was even asked by French authorities to issue a statement criticizing Veradzin's act. Veradzin settled in Boston
[179] Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, pp. 242.
[180] Ibid..
[181] Ibid., p. 243.
[182] Ibid., pp. 209-213.
[183] Sahakian, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, pp. 224-225.
[184] Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun , p. 493; Sahakian, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p. 225. The cabinet was formed as follows:-
- Mihran Damadian, Prime Minister.
- Vahram ZhamGochian, Minister of War & Gendarmerie (Hnchakist).
- Garabed Nalbandian, Minister of Agriculture (Hnchakist).
- Antranig Genjian, Minister of Economy (Hnchakist).
- Dr. Mnatsaganian, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Dashnakist).
- Dr. Bezirjian, Minister of Interior Affairs (Ramgavar).
- Lient Jeane, Minister of Education (Assyrian).
[185] Damadian, Im Husheres, pp. 171-181.
[186] Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, pp. 238-239.
[187] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 30, p. 61.
[189] Torossian, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, p. 253.
[194] The exception being some Armenian Catholic families who remained behind, alongside Syrian Orthodox and Maronite families, in Mersin and Adana only to be driven out in 1924-25. See: Vahe Tachjian, “Le sort de minorities de Cilicie et de ses environs sous le regime kémaliste dans les années 1920,” Revue d’Histoire Arménienne Contemporaine, tom III, numéro special, 1999, pp. 351-375.
[195] Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p. 235.
[196] Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, p. 284. According to Zeidner Ali Fu’ad (Cebesoy) was present during at least one of the meetings between Picot and Kemal in Sivas Cilicia and were to be withdrawn. Moreover, Picot confided in Kemal that George Clemenceau was not to win the elections in France and that Aristide Briand will replace him and cause French policy to come to a rapprochement with Turkey
[197] The sanjak of Alexandretta is a point of contention between Turkey and Syria
